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CEB Minutes 02/24/2000 RFebruary 24, 2000 TRANSCRIPT OF THE MEETING OF THE CODE ENFORCEMENT BOARD OF COLLIER COUNTY Naples, Florida, February 24, 2000 LET IT BE REMEMBERED, that the North Code Enforcement Board, in and for the County of Collier, having conducted business herein, met on this date at 10:00 a.m. in REGULAR SESSION in Building "F" of the Government Complex, East Naples, Florida, with the following members present: CHAIRMAN: Clifford Flegal George Ponte Don W. Kincaid Roberta Dusek Kathryn M. Godfrey Peter Lehmann Darrin Phillips Rhona Saunders Diane Taylor ALSO PRESENT:Jean Rawson, Attorney, Code Enforcement Board Michelle Arnold, Code Enforcement Director Maria Cruz, Enforcement Official Page 1 CODE ENFORCEMENT_BOARD OF COLLIER COUNTy, FLORIDA Date: February 24, 2000 at 8:30 o'clock A.M. . Location: Collier County Government Center, Admn, Bldg, 3rd Floor 1. Susan Murray 2. Barbara Burge~on 3. Stan Chrzanow~i 4. Johnnie Gebhard= 5, J~an Raw, on ~lanning Environmental Ravi~w Buildin~ ~ermit= Rules and Regulations NOTE: ANY ~RSON W340 DECIDES TO APPKAL A DECISION OF THIS BOARD WILL NEED A RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS P~RTAINING TH~RET0, AND TNER]~FORE MAY NEED TO ENSURE THAT A VERBATIM RECORD OF T~E PROCEEDINGS IS ,MADE, WHICH RECORD INCLUDES THE TESTIMONY A~ EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE A~PEAL iS TO ~ BASED. NEIT~RR COLLIF. R COUNTY NOR THE CODE ENFORCEMENT BOARD S~ALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING THIS RECORD. 1- ROLL CALL 2. APPROVAL OF AGENDA 3, APPROVAL OF MINUTES January 27, 2000 4. PUBLIC HEARINGS A. BCC vs. Southern Management Corp. B. BCC ~s. Paul L. and Barbara A. Riddleberger C. ~CC vs. N~ck S. Cen:enaro, TR. CEB No. 2000-001 CBB No. 2000-006 CEB No. 2000-008 A. BCC vs. William E. & Beverly ~. Murphy CEB No. 99-066 A. ~CC vs. Richard Lawrence Kniebes ~ Marsha L. Townsend CEB No. 99-073 7. REPORTS A. BCC vs. william E. & Beverly Murphy B. FORECLOS~ES 8. CO~E~S 9. ~E~ MEETING DATE March 23, 2000 ~ 0. A~O~ C~B No, 99-066 February 24, 2000 CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Okay, we'll call our February meeting of the Collier County Code Enforcement Board to order, please. Please make note that any person who decides to appeal a decision of this board will need a record of the proceedings pertaining thereto and, therefore, may need to ensure that a verbatim record of the proceedings is made, which record includes the testimony and evidence upon which the appeal is to be based. Neither Collier County nor the Code Enforcement Board shall be responsible for providing this record. May we have our roll call, please. MS. CRUZ: Good morning. For the record, Maria Cruz, code enforcement official. Roberta Dusek? MS. DUSEK: Here. MS. CRUZ: Clifford Flegal? MR. FLEGAL: Here. MS. CRUZ: Kathryn Godfrey? MS. GODFREY: Here. MS. CRUZ: Don Kincaid? MR. KINCAID: Here. MS. CRUZ: Peter Lehmann? MR. LEHMANN: Present. MS. CRUZ: Darrin Phillips? MR. PHILLIPS: Here. MS. CRUZ: George Ponte? MR. PONTE: Here. MS. CRUZ: Rhona Saunders? MS. SAUNDERS: Present. MS. CRUZ: Diane Taylor? MS. TAYLOR: Present. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Our agenda. Any changes, additions, deletions? MS. ARNOLD: Yes. Under public hearing, Item A, Board of County Commissioners versus Southern Management Corp. is going to be removed because they were in compliance when we Page 2 February 24, 2000 did our site visit yesterday. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Very good. Any other changes? MS. DUSEK: I make a motion that we accept the minutes as amended. MR. LEHMANN: Second that motion. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: The agenda. MS. DUSEK: Excuse me, the agenda. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: We have a motion and a second to accept the agenda as changed. All those in favor, signify by saying aye. Any opposed? (No response.) CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Thank you. Now, the minutes. Ms. Dusek. MS. DUSEK: Well, before we accept the minutes, I have one change, and that is in my name, it says Robert Dusek and it's Roberta. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Roberta. MS. ARNOLD: They keep doing that, don't they? MR. LEHMANN: Mr. Chairman, I'd move that we accept the minutes as amended. MR. PONTE: I'll second. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: We have a motion and a second to accept the minutes as amended. All those in favor, signify by saying aye. Any opposed? (No response.) CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Thank you. We now open our public hearing. Case No. 2000-006. MS. CRUZ: This case is Board of County Commissioners versus Paul L. and Barbara A. Riddleberger. Case No. CEB-2000-006. Let the record show that Mr. Paul Riddleberger is present. I've provided a copy to -- of an exhibit to the respondent, to the board and to the recorder. I'd like to ask the respondent if there's no objection to admitting this packet into evidence. Page 3 February 24, 2000 CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Mr. Riddleberger, I assume you got a copy of everything in the mail? Okay, do you have any objections as to the county entering that? MR. RIDDLEBERGER: No. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: All right, thank you. So entered. MS. CRUZ: I'd like to mark this Composite Exhibit A, please. The alleged violation before this board is a section -- is section of Ordinance 91-102, the Land Development Code, Section 2.6.7.1.1, and Section 2.6.7.2.1. The violation is described as an illegal storage of recreational vehicle. It's a boat and trailer. This violation exists at 3224 Areca Avenue, Naples, Florida, more particularly described as Sabal Shores, Block F, Lot 11. The owner of record is Paul L. Riddleberger, Sr. and Barbara A. Riddleberger. The address of record is 965 Partridge Circle, Apartment 202, Naples, Florida. The violation was first observed on October 5th, 1999. The notice of violation was served via posting on October 18th, 1999, requesting compliance by October 23rd, 1999. A final reinspection was conducted February 23rd, the year 2000, resulting in violation remaining. At this time I'll call Investigator John Kelly to define his findings during the investigations. MR. KELLY: Good morning, Chairman, members of the board. My name's John Kelly, Collier County Code Enforcement investigator. MS. ARNOLD: He needs to be sworn. (Speaker was duly sworn.) MR. KELLY: This case was initiated on October 5, 1999 by me during a routine patrol in response to several recreational vehicle complaints within the immediate vicinity. I was uncomfortable addressing the ones that were complained about without addressing another one on the street. So this case was initiated, once again, on October 5. We're dealing with two ordinances here. First is Ordinance 91-102, Section 2.6.7, which deals with the storage of vehicles without license plates. That ordinance also addresses trailers, Page 4 February 24, 2000 which is a part of this case. The second one is Ordinance 91-102, Section 2.6.7.2, which addresses the parking storage and use of recreational equipment. It states that in districts permitting single-family homes or mobile homes, that recreational· equipment must be stored in a rear yard, within a carport or fully enclosed structure, and some other allowances for waterfront homes, which this is not. It also provides an exclusion for a period of six hours within a seven-day period for the purposes of cleaning, loading and unloading. I'll get on with what the investigation revealed here. On October 5, 1999, I first observed two boat and trailer combinations stored to the front of the principal structure upon residentially zoned property; more specifically, residential multi-family, in excess of six hours. The first was a white boat in severe state of disrepair, and a trailer with no tags. And the second was a red boat displaying I.D. No. FL-2554-EV. And at that time I posted a red tag upon receiving no answer at the door. My second visit was a recheck on October 18, at which time the white boat had been removed. However, the red boat remained, continued to lack tags and remained to the front of the house. Let's see, I'm sorry, that check was October 25. Prior to that, on October 18, I had mailed an official notice of violation with the violations still there. That notice of violation was returned to us undeliverable; three attempts made by the postal service, as documented on the envelope. Since that time there has been contact with the owner of the equipment, stating that ,he has been attempting to comply; however, I've seen no visual observations that any attempts are being made. I've had one personal conversation and several telephone messages from him. The final recheck was performed yesterday, which resulted in both violations remaining. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Mr. Kelly, in checking yesterday, there Page 5 February 24, 2000 still is no tag on the trailer, correct? MR. KELLY: Correct. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Okay. MS. DUSEK: Mr. Kelly, as far as the time frame goes in your check, how did you determine that it was there for more than six hours? MR. KELLY: It was there a day prior to the case being initiated. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Okay, if I understand the two ordinances, the six hours really only kicks in if he has a licensed trailer. Since it's unlicensed, he's not allowed to keep it there at all; is that correct? MR. KELLY: For Ordinance 97-102 (sic), Section 2.6.7.1.1 states any vehicles or trailers without a current valid license plate must be stored within a completely enclosed structure, or may not be stored upon residentially zoned property. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Right. MR. KELLY: In any case, even if the vehicle did have a tag, it would need to be -- or correction, a recreational vehicle and trailer, if they did have a current tag, they would need to be stored in the rear yard or within a carport or completely enclosed structure. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Okay, That's what I thought. MR. LEHMANN: Mr. Kelly, during your inspections, did you notice any activities with the boats such as cleaning, loading, unloading, anything at all? MR. KELLY: There are several boat parts on the driveway next to the vehicle -- or the boat. However, I have never observed any activity at that location. In fact, I've never had a personal contact at that location, despite numerous visits. MR. LEHMANN: You think these parts were used in the repair of the vehicle? MR. KELLY: It's possible. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: But even if he's repairing the boat, since it doesn't have a license plate, it is not permitted, unless it's inside, correct? MR. KELLY: Correct. And any repairs would have been well Page 6 February 24, 2000 in excess now of six hours. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Okay. I guess what I'm trying to get at is six hours doesn't really apply since he doesn't have a license plate on the trailer. MR. KELLY: It does apply in that they're two separate ordinances. However, you're correct. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Two separate ordinances, but if you don't have a license plate, you must store the vehicle in an enclosed building. It doesn't say you can park it in your driveway overnight. If you don't have a license plate, you can't have it there other than in a completely enclosed building, period. MR. KELLY: Correct. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Okay. Any other questions for Mr. Kelly? Mr. Riddleberger, would you like to come up, sir? Just one moment, sir, we'll have the young lady swear you i11, (Speaker was duly sworn.) CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Yes, sir. MR. RIDDLEBERGER: I'd like to begin by apologizing to the board for taking your time up with this matter. I'll be brief. The problem that Mr. Kelly discussed is totally true. The reason that the trailer was not tagged was because when I went to get tags, the registration was not in the Florida system. When I took the metal tag off of the boat to go in to compare the VIN numbers to try to get the registration, the VIN numbers were too worn off and we could not recognize them. To make a very long story very short, I have in my possession here a temporary tag that was issued by the State of Florida, which I will be putting on the boat and removing the boat in very short order. Again, I apologize for having to take your time up with this matter, but it was very long and drawn because I had to go back to Maryland to get information regarding the original title. And at this point I'm still going to have to -- I'm still going to be required by the State of Florida to somehow remove the boat from the trailer and get the trailer weighed and then go back to Page 7 February 24, 2000 the Department of Motor Vehicles to get a permanent tag. But this temporary will allow me to move the boat to begin this process. I was unable to even take the boat to a storage area, because no storage area would accept it without a current registration. So had the time frame been a little different, I wouldn't even be standing here. Mr. Kelly would have found the boat gone several days ago. But I just received this yesterday. So if I could be granted a short period of time, as few as even a few days, I will be removing the boat from my house. When I received the first citation, I made arrangements to take the other boat immediately out, and so I have not been ignoring the code enforcement people. MS. TAYLOR: Did you ever try to contact Mr. Kelly and explain all this to him? MR. RIDDLEBERGER: Yes, I did. Yes, I did. On several occasions. As I mentioned, it was just a very long and drawn-out process. And I will certainly have to say that I probably could have done this in less time. But again, I apologize for having to take your time with this, but I am in the process of removing the boat. MR. PONTE: You want to put a real time frame on that? In how many days? MR. RIDDLEBERGER: I have 30 days on the temporary registration. But I certainly will -- I'm trying to make arrangements now to get the boat removed. I can't put the boat in water because, as Mr. Kelly said, it's under repair, so I need to actually get a crane or a hoist to remove the boat, set it in some cradle, and then take the trailer with the temporary tag to the dump. MR. PONTE: Are we talking five days, 10 days, 15 days? MR. RIDDLEBERGER: 10 days would be more than adequate. MR. PONTE: Ten days would be more than adequate? MR. RIDDLEBERGER: Yes. I would be grateful if I would be allowed 10 days to get this resolved. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Any other questions for Mr. Riddleberger? Page 8 February 24, 2000 MS. DUSEK: The only vehicle or item in the driveway now is the one boat and the trailer? MR. RIDDLEBERGER: Yes, ma'am. The other boat -- the other boat was there when I moved in, and I didn't even know who owned it. And there was another complication, because you can't just take a boat to the dump without having a title. So I had to literally cut the boat up and put it in the dumpster at work. MR. LEHMANN: Mr. Riddleberger, in this lO-day extension that you're requesting, will that allow you to effect any transaction you need so that the boat is either permitted to remain on your property in a titled fashion and in a fashion that complies with code, or is it to remove from the site? MR. RIDDLEBERGER: Barring any unforeseen circumstances, I think I've seen every circumstance I can see in this matter, yes. MR. LEHMANN: So you can obtain title for the trailer? MR. RIDDLEBERGER: Yes. MR. LEHMANN: Tag for the trailer? MR. RIDDLEBERGER: Yes. I have most of-- MR. LEHMANN: And obtain title for the boat. MR. RIDDLEBERGER: -- the information here. THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, I didn't get the rest of your response. MR. LEHMANN'- I forgot. No, title for the trailer -- license for the trailer and title for the boat. MS. ARNOLD: If I may, can I ask a couple of questions of the respondent? CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Yes, ma'am. MS. ARNOLD: Are you able to move the boat elsewhere on the property that would be legal under the county code? MR. RIDDLEBERGER: The only place I'll be able to move it will be a storage type unit, open air storage situation. MS. ARNOLD: So you're unable to move it on your property in the rear of the yard. MR. RIDDLEBERGER: I cannot get the boat to the rear of the yard. There's not enough clearance on either side. So it will Page 9 February 24, 2000 have to be moved to a storage facility. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Anything further? Thank you, Mr. Riddleberger. MR. RIDDLEBERGER: Thank you. MS. ARNOLD: FOr the board's information, there is a temporary use permit that can be issued to Mr. Riddleberger for a seven-day period for situations like that when you have recreational vehicles or temporary storage of a travel trailer. That permit can be obtained at the Community Development Services building. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: I guess I would recommend to my colleagues, since Mr. Riddleberger said he could have something accomplished in 10 days, it would be to our advantage to bring this to a close by finding the fact that there is a violation, and I would probably recommend that we give him 10 days to remove the violation and then impose a fine. That way it closes everything, he's got his 10 days. If he does it, fine. If he doesn't, he's going to start getting fined. And when he does it, this case goes away. That would probably be my recommendation to my colleagues. MR. LEHMANN: Is that a motion, Mr. Chairman? MS. SAUNDERS: But we haven't done -- MS. ARNOLD: You haven't closed the public hearing yet. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: We haven't closed that portion of it, but that's probably what I would recommend. Any other comments on the -- on this particular -- MS. DUSEK: My feeling is I hope that 10 days is enough for Mr. Riddleberger. I feel very lenient toward this case because he's been making every effort to correct it and has corrected part of it already. So I just hope that we will be allowing him enough time. If you feel that really is enough time, Mr. Riddleberger, 10 days. MR. LEHMANN: A real quick question for Ms. Arnold. Ms. Arnold, you indicated that a conditional use permit will allow him a seven-day period of time in which he could leave the boat where it's at. Page 10 February 24, 2000 MS. ARNOLD: Temporary use permit. MR. LEHMANN: Yes. Is that extendable? Is there an extension on that? MS. ARNOLD: Yes, there's a possibility for another seven-day extension. MR. LEHMANN: And what is the time period to acquire that permit? MS. ARNOLD: When he fills out the application, he gets it right then and there. MR. LEHMANN: So almost immediate one-day deal? MS. ARNOLD: Yes. MR. LEHMANN: So Mr. Riddleberger has the opportunity, if the board were to -- the finding of fact and then possibly impose a fine for 10 days to immediately go down to -- MS. ARNOLD: Correct. MR. LEHMANN: -- Horseshoe Drive and obtain a seven-day permit, which immediately comes into compliance with the board MS. ARNOLD: Right. MR. LEHMANN: -- or the code. And should he need to extend that, he could extend that for another seven days -- MS. ARNOLD: That's right. MR. LEHMANN: -- without any penalties. Again, that's another option for the board to consider. MS. DUSEK: I make the motion that a violation does exist in the case of the Board of County Commissioners versus Paul Riddleberger. Sr., and Barbara A. Riddleberger. The violation is of Section 2.6.7.1.1, and 2.6.7.2.1 of Ordinance No. 91-102, the Collier County Land Development Code. The description of the violation is the illegal storage of recreational vehicles, boat and trailer, specifically. MS. SAUNDERS: I'll second that motion. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: We have a motion and a second that there in fact is a finding of fact, a violation does exist. Any questions? All those in favor, signify by saying aye. Those opposed? Page 11 February 24, 2000 (No response.) CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Okay, order of the board? MR. PONTE: I think that your suggestion, Mr. Chairman, is clean cut. And I would support that, if you make it a motion. MS. ARNOLD: Could I recommend that you ask the respondent to obtain a permit? That way he's in compliance really with what the code says. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: I wouldn't have a problem with that. Anything that will help make the problem go away. I would make a motion that the order of the board be that the respondent immediately obtain a temporary use permit for the violation. Second, that the respondent be given 10 days to abate the violation. If in fact he does not abate within the 10 days, I would recommend a $50 a day fine to begin until the violation is abated. MR. PONTE: May I just suggest a slight amendment, make it 10 working days, because there are things that have to be done by the respondent that would involve others. Make it 10 working days so -- CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: I have no problem with that. MR. LEHMANN: I would further amend that to suggest that the respondent be requested to file for an extension should an extension be needed, so that he's constantly in compliance. I don't know if we can do that, Jean. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: If we give him the extension, though, that goes over the 10 days. That's going to get him in trouble. So we'd have to change the 10 days to -- MR. LEHMANN: Gotcha. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: So if you want to do both, tell him that he has to get an extension. I think one permit would be sufficient, if he works on it, personally. So right now it's -- get the seven-day permit, 10 working days. If he doesn't comply within 10 workings days, $50 a day fine. MR. LEHMANN: I second that motion. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: We have a motion and a second. Any further question? Page 12 February 24, 2000 All those in favor, signify by saying aye. Any opposed? (No response.} CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Thank you. Mr. Riddleberger, do you understand what we've given you orders to do? MR. RIDDLEBERGER: Yes, sir. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Okay, thank you, sir. We'll close the public hearings, because that's the end of business. New business. Affidavit of noncompliance, imposition of fines. MS. ARNOLD: This item was before the board on November 29th, 1999. It was a case of the Board of County Commissioners versus William E. and Beverly M. Murphy. This case was the construction of a chain link fence and the storage shed without first obtaining building permits. The respondent has since obtained a permit for the fence and modified it, according to permit specifications, and they've also obtained a permit for the shed. However, the permits were obtained after the date that the board ordered that they be done, and hence, a fine from the period of January 14th -- I'm sorry, from the period of December 16th through January 24th of $100 per day is being imposed, which is a total of $:3,900. MR. PONTE: I'd like to make a motion that now that the Murphys are in compliance, that we can consider a reduction of the fine to -- MS. ARNOLD: I believe Mr. Murphy's son is here to address that particular issue. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Let me back up and ask a question. The $3,900, does that include any of the costs, or is that strictly the $100 a day? MS. ARNOLD: That's strictly $100 a day. It doesn't include the cost for prosecuting the case. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Do we know what those are? MS. ARNOLD: If you give us one minute. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Okay. Page 13 February 24, 2000 MS. ARNOLD: No, we do not have the cost today, but we can get the cost. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Okay, I think it's important to -- for the board to remember that, you know, if there is some consideration, that we keep in mind that costs have to be paid, too. So any consideration for reduction should be plus cost. You say the Murphys' son is here to make a request or -- MR. MURPHY: Good morning. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: One moment, sir. Just one moment. (Speaker was duly sworn.) THE COURT REPORTER: Your name, please? MR. MURPHY: Kevin Murphy. Well, I come in today in place of my father, who apparently I thought could handle this matter that he had. And come to find out, that he didn't really understand what he was doing or where it was going. More or less very confused. And he didn't ask any of the family members to help to give him a hand to do this. And in turn, this is the mess that was created over that. When the fines were imposed, he was under the impression that they weren't, because he said somebody that he talked to said no, they're not being -- that went on past -- through Christmas, because with everything going on in the family and Christmas, we didn't want to try to tread any of that. Shortly after, I got ahold of Mr. Bogart, the supervisor, and asked if he could investigate this for me, because I didn't know totally what had been done. And in fact found out that the fines were being applied. And then shortly after that, I talked with Mr. Bogart at the end of December, and it was shortly after that that -- well, within eight days that I obtained permits for both the fence and the garage for my father. And he just was very confused in the whole matter and didn't request any help from the family. And I am asking you for a serious reduction in fines, because they both are retired. My mom has just retired, and it's not something that they need. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Give us your interpretation of a serious reduction of fines. Give us something that we can at least talk Page 14 February 24, 2000 about. MR. MURPHY: Well, I don't know. I understand what you had spoke of earlier with the cost factor involved with what it was to prosecute. I'm going to be one of the people helping my mother, because my dad is totally disabled and he doesn't work. My mom was working, and now she's not, so I'm going to be helping them in paying the fines. Whatever the -- I don't know, whatever a reasonable amount -- MS. DUSEK: Are you suggesting that the cost of prosecuting the case is what you would like to see as the fine? MR. MURPHY: If possible. If that sounds reasonable. I really don't have any argument either way. I know it wasn't brought to -- brought into code within the time frame. But by the time I got involved and really understood that he wasn't doing anything because he didn't know what he was doing, he didn't understand. And several occasions when I asked him, he just said, "1 don't know." He said, "They're supposed to get back with me." And-- MS. TAYLOR: Michelle, how long did this go on before he was brought before the board? MS. ARNOLD: I'm not really sure. We don't have the full case. But Mr. Murphy was trying his best to, you know, meet the board's order. And I think his son is absolutely right, he probably was very confused as to what needed to be done, not because staff didn't try to provide that assistance, but he just probably didn't understand. And I think it's -- it wasn't until his son got involved that it was done more expediently. And staff really wouldn't have an objection to reducing the fine to the cost for prosecution. MS. DUSEK: Do you have -- I know you don't have those costs here, but do you have an idea, a range? MS. ARNOLD: It's probably going to be around $300; 300, $350. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: I understand what we're saying and what Mr. Murphy is saying, and I want to be as compassionate as possible. But I need the board to fully understand that whatever we do, in that Mr. Murphy's dad didn't understand and got Page 15 February 24, 2000 confused, I don't want to open the door for everybody to walk before the board and say gee, I didn't understand what you wanted me to do. MS. TAYLOR: I agree. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: It's a bad precedent, because it's an easy out. I don't remember Mr. Murphy, and I'm sorry. You know, we see so many people. MR. MURPHY: That's why I took over, because he just couldn't do it. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: But the board needs to contemplate that whatever we do, we do open that gate for the next person to say exactly the same thing. And we all see a lot of people and hear a lot of cases and, you know, a month, two months, three months down the road it's hard to remember a certain person. And while we want to help the people of the county as much as possible, we need to keep that in mind. Precedents do get set very easily. MR. PONTE: If I just might take that a step further and say that I agree with you about that, but the boards' function primarily is to bring things into compliance or to urge them into compliance. In this case, the respondent is in compliance, and his request I think is reasonable. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Understanding your comment, keep in mind that when we impose the fines and the people don't comply, that's the only tool we have to hopefully get them into compliance. So basically you could construe that once everybody gets into compliance they come before the board and say gee, waive our fines because you did it for them. So I think that's really not what we want to do. We want to get you into compliance, but when you don't, you need to understand that not coming into compliance costs you something, because you could have done it. Most cases we see, if we look at them, have gone on for months and some of them years, for whatever reason. And now all of a sudden I don't want them to think that the board in imposing fines says gee, now that you're in compliance we're going to waive 1,000, 10,000, 20,000 just because you complied. Page 16 February 24, 2000 I think that's the wrong attitude to give out to the message. Extenuating circumstances, I'm all for it. If something happened, you know, I'm for trying to help. But I want the board to be very careful, because it is a great precedence that opens a pretty big floodgate for everybody to walk back to the board. MS. DUSEK: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to make a motion that we reduce the fines to $1,000. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Including the costs, or plus the cost? MS. DUSEK: That's everything. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Okay. MR. LEHMANN: Ms. Arnold, could I ask you a question? Would you refresh my memory and possibly the board's on this particular case? First off, how long did it take staff in working with this particular case before it was brought to the board, and why did you eventually bring it to the board? MS. ARNOLD: The case initiated in March of '99, and the reason why we brought it to the board is because as with all the cases we bring before the board, we weren't proceeding to obtain compliance without this form of prosecution. MR. LEHMANN: So you needed the board's action, in other words, to achieve compliance? MS. ARNOLD: Right. MR. LEHMANN: So it had progressed 11 months; I think it was November, was it? Yeah, November. MS. ARNOLD: Right. MR. LEHMANN: So it progressed approximately 11 months, it finally was brought before the board. On the board's action -- according to the respondent's own testimony, he's indicated that his father really still did not understand or take any actions until the respondent's son actually got -- MS. ARNOLD: Well, Mr. Murphy had tried to take a.c. tion. I mean, he contacted myself and he contacted the invest,gator, and he had explained to me that he was trying to get a contractor to do the work. But I don't know what transpired when he was, you know, making contact with the different contractors. I just know that it wasn't until his son got involved that it was able to get correCted more expediently. Page 17 February 24, 2000 MR. LEHMANN: My comments to the bOard, in a large portion I agree with our Chairman's comments, the board does not want to set a precedence in this case. At the same time, we do want to look at a case realistically. And the board's purpose again is to achieve compliance, period. It's not to collect fines, it's to achieve compliance in as quick a manner as possible. In this particular case, it actually took a board action, as in many cases, to achieve that compliance. The reduction of rate, we've heard discussions about the cost of prosecuting, the cost of $1,000 reduction. I don't know where it's at myself personally, but those are the thoughts that I'm thinking of. MS. DUSEK: Well, I agree with you and my other colleagues, that we can't just forego the fine, that we need to impose a fine, because this is our only leverage in making people comply. Listening to your personal situation, you understand that we can't just-- MR. MURPHY: .I understand, yes. MS. DUSEK: -- let go of everything? MR. MURPHY: I understand. MS. DUSEK: And also, I agree with Mr. Ponte that our mission is to make sure that people come into compliance. So I think in this circumstance that's why I made that motion of $1,000, which I think is fair in my own mind. MR. LEHMANN: One of the problems that the board has had in the past, in fact, when I first joined the board, one of the problems that I looked at is the board had no teeth, in essence. Where the general public would look at the Code Enforcement Board, staff would work with respondents to extraordinary periods of time, sometimes two years to try to achieve compliance on simple little issues. And finally they would come before the board, the board would take action and we would achieve compliance. I think the board needs to retain its position as a final judging authority in that. I think in arbitrarily waiving fines, as our Chairman has said, we open up precedence for that. So although I agree that some adjustment to the fine is Page 18 February 24, 2000 probably warranted in this particular case, I'm not so sure the adjustment down into the administrative cost is proper. Possibly somewhere between that and the 3,900. And as our colleague had indicated, maybe 1,000. But it is -- we do want to be compassionate, we do want to understand that in general we have very good citizens in Collier County, and we want to be compassionate of those citizens. But at the same time, I think the respondents and the citizens of Collier County need to understand that staff is trying to work with them, and all that they're really looking for is to comply with the ordinances that the commissioners have established, that the people themselves have established. MR. PONTE: I'd like to just add one thing so that we stay focused on the severity of the violation. The violation involves a fence, and I think we ought to take that into consideration. MS. ARNOLD: The violation -- MR. LEHMANN: Fence and storage shed. MS. ARNOLD: -- of storage building. MR. LEHMANN: But in essence what we have are two structures that were built without a permit. It's not an uncommon problem for the board. We are constantly hearing cases where that involves just that. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: I think what we should all remember is that we basically take the severity into consideration when we establish the original fine. In this case we set it at $100 a day. Now what the board should think of is when somebody asks for a consideration to reduce a fine is that what circumstances are placed before you that would permit a reduction in the fine? The fact that they complied, I don't think is a good enough one. The fact that something else is going to -- that affected their process in complying sooner should be considered. It may be some other -- something happened where they couldn't comply sooner should be considered*. But the initial $100 a day was established prior. Now let's decide okay, we want to reduce it because of "X'. And I think part of the "X' now that Mr. Murphy has come before us in saying that his dad maybe didn't really understand or Page 19 February 24, 2000 lacked the ability to get it done in a timely fashion and was a little confused about it and his son took over and got it done as quickly as possible, I understand that and I can accept that in trying to make a decision. What that decision is, I don't know. Right now we have a motion on the floor, Ms. Dusek, of $1,000. I have -- no one has -- we had some questions, but we haven't had a second, so -- MS. DUSEK: I also think that you should consider what staff has said. They have also relayed the message to us that this person was trying. It wasn't as though he was completely ignoring the situation, as many people do. MS. SAUNDERS: I will second the motion. I was debating whether we should reduce the fine to $10 a day plus court costs, if that worked better for the board. But I think it's pretty close either way, and $1,000 ends it today. I do think there needs to be some kind of a fine, I agree with that. I do think the circumstances are such, and unfortunate, maybe this becomes a lesson that somebody says okay, I've got to step in. So I will second the motion. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Okay, we have a motion and a second to reduce the fine to $1,000 to include all costs and everything. Any question about that? All those in favor of reducing it to $1,000, signify by saying aye. Any opposed? (No response.} CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Okay, $1,000, Mr. Murphy. MR. MURPHY: Thank you very much. MS. SAUNDERS: Sorry about that, but -- MS. ARNOLD: If I may just jump a little bit ahead of the agenda and just indicate, Item 7 under reports is the affidavit of compliance for this same case. Just providing that information to the board. Under old business, we have a motion from the attorney representing Mr. Richard Lawrence Kniebes and Martha L. Townsend, the .owners of the property that was heard under Case No. 99-073. The motion is for rehearing or reconsideration for Page 20 February 24, 2000 that case. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: MS. RAWSON: Yes. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: ordinance. MS. RAWSON: Yes. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: I have some questions for Ms. Rawson. As I -- help me on interpretation of the In rehearing a case -- let's see. The request to rehear is to be based on it's contrary to the evidence, or the hearing involved an error in ruling of law. Is that our only two options? MS. RAWSON: Yes. In answer to your question, that's exactly what it says. I have talked to Mr. Erickson on the telephone. The reason he's asking to -- I'll let him tell you why he's asking it to be reheard. It basically isn't either one of those, it's because he is going to, I think, tell you that his client didn't get noticed. So I guess we need to hear from Mr. Erickson before you decide. MR. LEHMANN: In this rehearing, have we defined the deadline dates, what would have been the deadline dates? 10 or 20 days? MS. RAWSON: We probably ought to hear from Mr. Erickson before I give you any legal advice. I've read his motion and I've talked to him on the telephone. And I think you have a copy of his motion. And I think what he's saying is that he got noticed and he couldn't be here that day, and you had the hearing, knowing he couldn't be here without him. He didn't have adequate opportunity to present his defense. I think that's -- MR. ERICKSON: That is essentially correct. Mr. Kniebes was given -- CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: One moment. MR. ERICKSON: I'm sorry. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: I didn't bring my package with this, but as I remember, that was a meeting you weren't here? MS. RAWSON: It was December the 23rd, and I was not here. But the minutes would reflect, I think, that you discussed whether or not to continue it. Page 21 February 24, 2000 CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Correct, that's what I'm remembering, because I specifically-- MS. RAWSON: I read the minutes. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: -- specifically asked the attorney if we could do that. If you'd swear him in, please. (Speaker was duly sworn}. MR. ERICKSON: I'm Louis Erickson, attorney, practicing law in Collier County, Florida. I'm here on behalf of Mr. Kniebes. We have filed this request for rehearing or reconsideration, and I do understand and understood at the time that there may be some time difficulties that we had in filing this request, as well as the other matters. This has been an ongoing problem with Mr. Kniebes at his place in Naples Manor for several months. We recognize that. The hearing was set up, and at that time it was set for, I believe it was, December 23rd. Mr. Kniebes gave a letter, which I believe went into the file to Mr. Labollis (phonetic), in which he explained that he had previous airplane tickets to visit his mother out of town during that day, and he thought that he was getting a continuance. He relied when he should not have relied upon that, there's no question about that. Apparently that was treated as a motion for continuance and it was denied. Obviously he wasn't here. And the end result was apparently the order, the findings of fact, conclusions of law and order of the board. The reason for -- that we requested the rehearing is because this is a complicated matter. Mr. Kniebes has not perhaps handled it as appropriately as he should. He's felt quite -- he was going to go to this hearing on the 23rd, I believe, and contest whether or not there was -- this was a case of selective enforcement. That type of defense, which I'm sure you all have heard before, that his place in Naples Manor is singled out as opposed to other places. When he came -- he came to me almost immediately after he received the order, appeared -- you know, looking at my time Page 22 February 24, 2000 frame, the order was dated December 29th. He came to me, I believe, January 11th. I think he got the order a few days before that. As soon as he came to me, I contacted Ms. Rawson to find out what the procedure was, because I do not specialize in this practice of law. And she had explained somewhat what the procedure was. So that is why I filed the motion for the rehearing or reconsideration. I also immediately contacted the next day Maria Cruz at code enforcement -- Collier County Code Enforcement, and we set up a meeting to address the matter, which was held the next Monday or Tuesday. So we moved very expediently. Because in looking at this matter, I recognize it is a very complex matter. As I was going to -- as I was previously saying, I believe Mr. Kniebes was going to come here and argue to the court -- or to the panel here, the board, that this was selective enforcement. Basically what we have is various violations, apparent code violations, matters that were constructed on his premises prior to the time he bought the place, the house in Naples Manor in 1990 or 1988. There is a storage shed that was turned -- there is a room that was turned into a Florida room, a patio that was turned into a Florida room, there was a shed of some sort that was turned into a laundry room, and then a third matter is a trailer that he has in the back of his house that he uses for storage that has been there for about six or eight years that does not have a tag and has never -- apparently has not had a tag for quite some time. All these -- there were some permits obtained. That's what our research -- we had to come and research this. Found there were some permits that were obtained when these areas were constructed. In fact, I believe all of them had permits of some sort. There's also a fence, that was the fourth matter, a fence that was built. And apparently the person who did the permits got basic permits for a utility and didn't get the permits for Page 23 February 24, 2000 electric and plumbing that was necessary for the laundry room, and didn't get the elevation permits perhaps that were necessary for the Florida room. And these are the problems that have been created. After meeting with the people at the county, at the Collier County Code Enforcement, I found out and Mr. Kniebes found out that there is a procedure. And what they basically indicated what he needs to do is go in and apply for permits after the fact and the county -- the inspectors will then come in and find out if everything is current, up to date, as far as the electric, plumbing. He has to reconstruct the record, essentially, as I understand it. And doing that, he went out and just received yesterday an elevation from his mortgage company. He needed to get an elevation statement of some sort so he could -- MS. ARNOLD: Mr. Chairman, in a sense, what he's doing is providing you testimony. What he's here for is to ask you whether or not you want to hear that testimony. MR. ERICKSON: But I was just giving -- that is somewhat correct. I was trying to be brief on this. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: I was waiting for him to get finished, because I'm going to say the same thing, this is all interesting, but what you need to convince this panel is, is why we should rehear this case. MR. ERICKSON: Okay. It needs to be reheard because of the complexity of the matter and the amount of time it's going to take to comply with the requirements, and to take into consideration all the matters that would have been taken into consideration when this was first brought to the board. The fact that these all existed prior to the time he purchased and prior to -- and have coexisted for eight years or continued for eight years has been nothing particularly new. Now, he does recognize now, after he checked with counsel and checked with it, that it is something he's got to comply with. He wasn't sure he agreed with the inspectors at first. Perhaps he should have, but he didn't. And he was going to come to the board with the idea that he'll find out from the board whether he has to. Page 24 February 24, 2000 Well, in looking into it, he realizes now that he has to comply with it, because the board's going to insist on it, obviously. And secondly, even if he ever sells the place, to make sure everything's in compliance, now that he's clearly put on notice that it's not. So we're asking -- the reason for the reconsideration is that I believe the relief that was -- the order that was presented cannot fairly be met by Mr. Kniebes. And I will point out that Ms. Townsend is no longer involved in this. Mr. Kniebes is the only owner of the property at this time. He's in the process -- he would like reconsideration so that he can be given adequate time to comply with this matter. And that is the primary purpose for the reconsideration. MR. LEHMANN: Ms. Arnold, I don't have my case file in front of me in this particular case. THE COURT REPORTER: Please speak into the mike. MR. LEHMANN: You're going to make me work for a living. How long did this case take before it got to the board? CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: It started in July. MS. ARNOLD: Yeah, it started in July of '99. MR. LEHMANN: So the respondents had six months to figure out what's going on with the case, in essence? MS. ARNOLD: Right. MS. RAWSON: I think procedurally you need to deal with this. You actually considered that a motion for continuance, and then you had a vote and voted not to continue it in December. So what you need to procedurally do, I think, is to reconsider your vote not to continue it. You -- of the December 23rd. That's really the motion you need to reconsider. MR. LEHMANN: Mr. Chairman, as I read the order, basically it gives a 10 to 20-day limit. I'd like to know whether that's been filled. But also, the request for hearing, as you mentioned, is based on two grounds: On the ground that the decision was contrary to evidence, or the hearing involved an error of ruling of law. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Correct. Page 25 February 24, 2000 MR. LEHMANN: And that's it. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: That's what I was going to get to Ms. Rawson. MR. LEHMANN: That's exactly what -- MS. RAWSON: That is correct. MR. LEHMANN: -- they are here for. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL.' Right now, and the way I read the documents, Ms. Rawson, he is within the time limit, as I read this, because he must be within 10 days of receipt or 28 days of mailing. So his thing is dated 21 -- I think that's the 21st of January. And if it was mailed on the 29th of -- I think it was the 29th of December, somewhere around there. Did I remember that date? It was dated the 29th, so it had to be mailed probably that day, so 29 December to 21 January is within the 30-day period. So that's -- or 28-day period, I'm sorry. So now we're down to the board needs to consider the motion for rehearing, and under the ordinance there are only two items contrary to evidence, as I remember. And I did in fact for this one bring my package. The evidence -- MS. ARNOLD: Can I make a correction? It's 20 days of mailing, not 28 days. MR. LEHMANN: As I read it, specifically-- CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Very good. MR. LEHMANN.' -- this is Section 12. Let me give you -- Ordinance No. 92-80. Item No. 1, either the prosecutor or the violator may request a rehearing of the decision of an enforcement board. The request for rehearing shall be made in writing and shall be filed with the clerk of the enforcement board within 10 days of the date of receipt of the board's written order, but in no event more than 20 days from the date of mailing of that written order. The request for rehearing shall be based only on the ground that the decision was contrary to the evidence or that the hearing involved an error on a ruling of law, which was fundamental to the decision of the enforcement board. The written request for rehearing shall specify the precise reasons therefore. And Mr. -- Page 26 February 24, 2000 MS. RAWSON: Aren't you glad I gave them all a copy of the law? CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: It's dangerous when you give us some knowledge. MR. LEHMANN: It's dangerous when you give us enough information to get us in trouble. In Mr. Kniebes' motion for rehearing and reconsideration, I do not see anything in this particular motion as written that would indicate to me that we have one of those two conditions satisfied. Again, I'm a lay person, I'm not an attorney. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: That's okay. Let's back up to your initial question, which I now think makes the whole thing moot, possibly. 20 days of mailing. If in fact I signed this thing on the 29th of December, that was the date of the order. So that's probably the date I signed it. I assume it was mailed that date. 20 days from the 29th of December gets us to what? And I do not believe it's the 21 st of January. Therefore, the notice was after the fact. So we have' nothing to consider, because he didn't do it within the time limit. MS. RAWSON: There would be a certificate of mailing, certificate of service, on the bottom of the order that says what date it was mailed. And it's usually -- MR. ERICKSON: It says the 29th. MS. RAWSON: It's always the same day you sign it. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: So if it was mailed the 29th of December, we add 20 days. His motion -- and it says a request for rehearing must be in writing and it is in writing and it's dated by him the 21st day of January, so that's outside the time limit. We have nothing to do. MR. ERICKSON: Well, I would request, as Ms. Rawson indicated, perhaps the board could hear it as a motion for reconsideration of the motion to continue. Because that's really where the error -- where it seems the error came. By not allowing the continuance, the board did not receive all the evidence and testimony that the board would have been would have had to -- or that the board I believe should have had to Page 27 February 24, 2000 make a fully informed ruling. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Ms. Rawson, there -- correct me if I'm wrong. MS. RAWSON: You've got the same time constraints. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Right. I mean, a rehearing is a rehearing under whatever, and it's outside the limits. So, I mean, there's really nothing for us to consider. Time has passed and the item is done. As for the comment that there's additional evidence or whatever, the -- and the respondent not being here, I specifically remember asking if we posted all the notices, did everything that's required under the law, and that was done. The fact that you failed to show up is your personal problem. MR. LEHMANN: In essence what the respondent is asking is for the board to violate the ordinance. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Correct. And I'm not interested in doing that. So at this point the request for rehearing and reconsideration, because it's outside the time limits, I would make a motion that we deny it. MS. DUSEK: I second that motion. MR. LEHMANN: Second that motion. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: So we have a motion and a second to deny the rehearing or reconsideration. Any question? All those in favor, signify by saying aye. Those opposed? (No response.) CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Sorry, sir. Affidavit of compliance. Did we -- MS. ARNOLD: Yeah, we did that. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: -- we accepted that? Okay, foreclosures. MS. ARNOLD: I provided you with a memorandum from Assistant County Attorney Melissa Vasquez. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Right. I've read it and I guess I have a couple of questions, and which you can ask and they're probably going to have to provide us a little more information. Page 28 February 24, 2000 The three with superior interests, which are of greater value than our liens. I'm not sure what the eight are, because I have an old list, and there's more than eight on my list. So I don't know what we're -- the eight we're talking about. I guess we really need to know the eight that's concerned, specifically those three. Because if there is totally no possibility that the county can do anything, rather than carry them on for infinitum, I think it would be advantageous for the board to just -- however we would do that, dismiss them, get it over with and get them off the records. I mean, the fines keep going. And if we're already at a point where, you know, you've got a $10 piece of property and he already owes $100,000, I mean, it's a waste of time. Especially if we're not ever going to get there. So I think we need to know what are these eight and specifically these three which we're basically have no chance of doing anything. Can you find that out for us? MS. ARNOLD: Yeah. Melissa had hoped to be here this morning. Obviously she didn't make it. But I will ask that question of her and clarify for the board at the next meeting just exactly which cases we are. We'll bring an update to that spreadsheet that we provided to you at a prior hearing. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Okay. In line with foreclosures, I have a question on payment. Back in September, on our famous Wood case, we stood here and we negotiated with Mr. Pires a reduced fee and come up with a number. Has that been paid? MS. ARNOLD: There's an outstanding balance of $500. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: I would like you to contact Mr. Pires and tell him that unless we receive a check for $500 immediately, I am asking you to advise the county attorney to foreclose. His three-month period is up. We made a deal. I thought it would be paid then and it obviously hasn't been. MS. ARNOLD: Okay, I will contact Mr. Pires. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Anyone else have any questions on foreclosures? MS. DUSEK: I just have a general question, just for my own Page 29 February 24, 2000 clarification. And Michelle, perhaps you can answer this. When we impose these liens and it gets to the point where we can foreclose on the property, and the liens now are so high that the property value isn't there, what happens to that property? I mean, does it just revert back to the homeowner and the liens are taken away and -- MS. ARNOLD: Well, I believe the board has the ability to consider modification of fines at that point as well, too. I don't see why you have to do it for the full amount just because it sat there for 10 years and we did nothing on those. But unless Jean has -- CHAIRMAN FLEGAL-' If the liens on -- once we put the lien on the property, for whatever the amount is, unless we lift the lien, it's there for the full 20 years. MS. RAWSON: That's right. And they can't sell the property CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Unless they -- MS. RAWSON: -- or dispose of the property without satisfying the lien. And if there's a foreclosure from the bank, for example, on the first mortgage, we'll be standing in line with everybody else. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Right. And on the ones that are done after we got in the super priority position, we're ahead of the mortgage company, so if they want the property back, they're going to have to pay us our lien. MS. RAWSON: Right. MR. LEHMANN: Jean, do the respondents have the ability to come back before the board or any other authority to reduce that lien amount? MS. RAWSON: They have the right to come and ask, sure. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: I think the ones that -- as I remember what I think Melissa had mentioned this before, some of these are so old, I mean, the liens are up to the $400,000 number and the property's worth 20,000 bucks. And there's other people ahead of us. So my interest would be naturally we don't want to spend any money to foreclose, because we're not going to get anything, Page 30 February 24, 2000 other than spending the county's money. I think at that point the board needs to just say look, on this particular one let's, I guess, waive the whole process and remove the county's lien and we're done, and let somebody else worry about it. I think that's probably our only choice. MR. LEHMANN: Well, I think it's in the best interest of the citizenship. The taxpayers are funding it, basically. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: You only have about 15 minutes for your speech, so why don't we forego to -- would anybody object to at our next meeting if we do what we did at this meeting, maybe coming 30 minutes early? I don't know how that fits with your schedule, Jean. I know you have something in the mornings. MS. RAWSON: I have the chamber board meeting at 7:30 at the Ritz. This is February, I needed a helicopter this morning. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Why don't we do it this way: Why don't MS. RAWSON: We could do it -- CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: -- start a little later, rather than 9:00, maybe 9:30 and that gives Jean a change to get here and -- MS. RAWSON: I'll leave a little bit earlier. Maybe the traffic won't be quite as bad. That's fine. Next month is March, and that is, according to the present rules and regulations that we're living by -- and no one has suggested we change that -- that is the annual organizational meeting where we elect officers. And it's, you know, my desire that at that meeting we also amend and pass rules and regulations. I was hoping we could do this today so I'd have them all nice and clean and ready to hand out for you and sign next month, but we can discuss them first, and then I'll get them back to you, we can sign them at the April meeting. But just keep in mind, that is your organizational meeting, so it's probably a very good time to talk about amending our rules and regulations. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Correct. How does that work, Michelle, if we start the public hearing say at 9:30 instead of 9:00 but we actually meet at 9:00 and let Page 31 February 24, 2000 Jean do her-- MS. ARNOLD: Sure. It would be -- CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: -- little presentation and guide us through some of these? MS. ARNOLD: Yeah, it would be similar to what we did today. We'll just notify the respondent that they don't have to be there until 9:30. MS. RAWSON: My term is up on the chamber board in May, by the waY. It's the end of my three years. And so that doesn't necessarily mean I'll always be on time, but that I don't have an excuse. How's that? MS. TAYLOR: It only took me an hour and five minutes to get here this morning, and I was late. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: Any other items for the board or the staff? MR. LEHMANN: Michelle, if we decide to change the times of these meetings, would you put it in great big bold print on our packet? MS. ARNOLD: Well, we'll call. We'll try calling, too. Because, I mean, everyone's so used to meeting at a certain time, and it's so easy to overlook when we change those times. So we'll try calling as well. Because the same thing happened with our staff in the control room over there, they just assumed it was going to be at 9:00, so -- MS. RAWSON: Well, you know, you actually moved it from 8:30 to 9:00 to accommodate me, and I appreciate that. But like I said, after April -- I don't know if they'll make me attend the May meeting or not, maybe not -- I don't have a conflict. I mean, I'll -- I can start earlier. And I appreciate the fact that you did that for me. MR. PONTE: I like 9:00. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: I think the 9:00 is a nice time. Our next meeting is March 23rd. Everybody make a mental note, and the staff, I'm sure, will inform us. I would entertain a motion, if there's nothing else. MS. DUSEK: I make a motion that we adjourn. MS. SAUNDERS: Second. Page 32 February 24, 2000 aye. MR. LEHMANN: I second. CHAIRMAN FLEGAL: All those in favor, signify by saying Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. There being no further business for the good of the County, the meeting was adjourned by order of the Chair at 11:20 a.m. COLLIER COUNTY CODE ENFORCEMENT BOARD CLIFFORD FLEGAL, CHAIRMAN TRANSCRIPT PREPARED ON BEHALF OF GREGORY COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC., BY CHERIE' R. LEONE, NOTARY Page 33