Motion2 CELU20200000904 FOGGS INVESTMENTS LLCCODE ENFORCEMENT. COLLIER COUNTY, FLORIDA
Office of the Special Magistrate
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
COLLIER COI]NTY, FLORIDA
Plaintiff,
vs.CASE NO.: CELU20200000904
FOGGS INVESTMENTS LLC,
ResPondent.
MOTION TO DISMISS NOTICE OF VIOLATION IN CASE NUMBER
CELU2O2OOOOO9O4 OR LIMIT HEARING
COMES NOW, Responden! FOGGS INVESTMENTS LLC, by and through its
undersigned counsel, and pursuant to the Rules and Regulations goveming Code Enforcement
proceedings in Collier County and files this Motion to Dismiss the Notice of Violation dated May
11,2020, in Case Number CELU20200000904, as a violation ofRespondent's right to procedural
due process or, in the altemative, limit the Hearing set for August 7, 2020, on the Notice, and in
support thereof, Respondent would state as follows:
Notice of Violation
l. On May 11,2020, Foggs lnvestments LLC ("Foggs") was served with a Notice of
Violation that stated:
Description of Conditions CoNtituting the Violation(s):
Did witness: The processing/recycling Gravel, Stone/Concrete and earthly material without
a conditional use. [Exh A].
2. Whether a hearing on a Notice ofViolation is conducted by fte Code Enforcement Board
or the Special Magistrate, the burden ofproof is on the Prosecutor to show by a preponderance of
Page I of 12
evidence that a violation does exist and the violator committed or was responsible for maintaining
or allowing the violation to continue. [Section 2-2029(4) Collier County Code ofOrdinances]
3. Foggs will not be required to defend against the stated violation unless Collier County
proves, by a preponderance ofthe evidencer, that:
a. Foggs was processing gravel, or Foggs was processing stone or Foggs wils
processing concrete or Foggs was processing earthly [src] material; or
b. Foggs was recycling gravel or Foggs was recycling stone or Foggs was recycling
concrete or Foggs was recycling earthly [src] material; and
c. Foggs did not have a conditional use to process gravel, or did not have a conditional
use to process stone or did not have a conditional use to process concrete or did not
have a conditional use to process earthly [sic] material; or
d. Foggs did not have a conditional use to recycle gravel, or did not have a conditional
use to recycle stone or did not have a conditional use to recycle concrete or did not
have a conditional use to recycle earthly [src] material.
4. The Notice ofviolation stated the alleged activity was in violation ofthe collier county
Land Development Code ("LDC"), as amended, Section 2.02.03, Prohibited Uses, which reads:
Any use or structure not specifically identified in a zoning district as a permitted use,
conditional use or accessory use shall be prohibited in such zoning district. [Exh B].
5. A fair reading ofthe stated violation in the Notice and the stated reference to LDC Section
I In those cases initiated by a Notice ofViolation, the County shall proceed first
with the presentation of its evidence to prove that a violation has occurred. [Collier County
Special Magistrate, Rules and Regulations, Article VII, Section 2(g)1. + Ifbefore the Code
Enforcement Board, the county shall present its case first. [collier county code Enforcement
Board, Rules and Regulations, Article D((i)1.
Page 2 of 12
2.02.03, put Foggs on notice that it could be required to defend against the allegations that it was
a.) processing or recycling, b.) that it was processing or recycling gravel, stone, concrete or earthly
material, and c.) that such was a violation of its conditional use zoning. Foggs could anticipate
that if, in fact, any alleged activity was fomd to be in violation of its conditional use zoning, then
that alleged activity would need to cease.
6. The Notice listed the "corrective action" that Foggs must take:
2. Cease any and all unauthorized activity...
This corrective action supports Foggs "fair reading" ofthe Notice of Violation.
7. Ifthe above was the relevant entirety ofthe Notice, Foggs would not have any basis for
requesting dismissal of the Notice, but the Notice contains much more. The Notice also indicates
that Foggs is in violation of LDC Section l.M.0l(A) which reads:
(A). The provisions ofthis LDC shall apply to all land, property, and development in the
total unincorporated area of Collier County except as expressly and specifically provided
otherwise in this LDC. No development shall be undertaken without prior authorization pursuant
to the LDC.
Specifically, no building, structure, land or water shall be hereafter developed or occupied,
and no building, structure or part thereof shall be erected, reconstructed, moved, located, or
structurally altered except in conformity the regulations set forth herein and for the zoning district
in which it is located. [Exh C].
8. Foggs is without knowledge as to why LDC Section 1'04.01(4) was included in the
Notice.2 There is no reference to a buitding or structure included in the noticed Description ofthe
2 If before the Special Magistrate, the "charging document shall include a statement
ofthe facts and circumstances ofthe alleged violation and shall identifo the code or ordinance
that has been violated." [collier county Special Magistrate, Rules and Regulations, Article v,
Section l]. Ifbefore thr code Enforcement Board, the code Enforcement Investigator files an
..Affidavit of Violation which shall include a statement of the facts and circumstances of the
alleged violation and shall identiS the code or ordinance that has been violated.." [Collier
County Code Enforcement Board, Rules and Regulations' Article VII, Section ll'
Page 3 of 12
Violation, and indeed Code Enforcement knows with absolute certainty that no building or
structure is involved. Investigator John Fuentes has been on the Foggs property numerous times
since this investigation was opened in luruary,2020, and more importantly, the Description ofthe
Violation begins with the phrase, "Did Witness..." Nor is a violation included in the Notice that
involves a building or structure of any kind and the inclusion ofthe reference to LDC Section
1.04.01(A) in the Notice of Violation violates due process and the Rules and Regulations
goveming any Code Enforcement proceeding. (See, fn.l).
9. That is not all. Apart from requiring all unauthorized activity to cease, the "Order to
Correct Violation(s)" directs Foggs to take additional corrective action:
l. Must comply with all land use standards of the Collier County Land Development
Code 04-41, as amended and adhere to the approved Site Development Plan for
said location."
The Notice of Violation alleges Foggs is angaged in unauthorized activity related to the processing
or recycling of gavel, stone, concrete or earthly material, and should Code Enforcement provide
competent and substantial evidonce that any of that is a violation ofFoggs conditional use zoning,
then Collier County wants the unauthorized activity to cease. The remainder ofthe requested
remedy has no relationship to the stated violation and is not supported by any facts or
circumstances in the Notice. Collier County's demand for this corrective action violates due
process.
There is still more in the Notice. The "order to correct violation(s)" also demands Foggs:
2. "Cease any and all unauthorized aclivity..." which Foggs agrees would be an
appropriate remedy if a violation was proved up. But then, the statement of the corrective action
continues, ")rlrrcl, is nof permitted, accessory, or an approved conditional use for that location ."
Page 4 of 12
In other words, Collier County's demand for corrective action is notjust to cease "any and all
unauthorized activity'' related to the alleged processing or recycling of gravel, stone/concrete and
earthly materials, but all unauthorized activity. However, the Notice fails to inform Foggs of what
other "activity" Collier County had determined is "unauthorized," and fails to again inckude the
facts and circumstances that constitute the violation. Collier County can only get the remedy is
seeks here ifthe alleged offensive unknown and unauthorized activity is disclosed to Foggs for the
first time at the Hearing, again a violation ofhis right to procedural due process.
3. "Must obtain all required Collier County approvals, if applicable, by any means
required to operate the processing/recycling activities or remove all related
materials all related material and equipment for unapproved uses on said land'"
This requested reliefis patently outside the scope ofthe alleged violation, impermissibly invades
Foggs constitutional righs as a private property owner and is classic govemmental overreach. If
the evidence shows that Foggs was in some way in violation of its conditional use, then it is
Foggs' decision, and only Foggs decision, to "obtain all required Collier County approvals to
operate the processing/recycling activities, " ,o continue the activity. This demand exceeds Collier
County Code Enforcement's authority under both the state and federal constitutions. Furthermore,
the alleged violation is for t}te processing or recycling ofgravel, stone, concrete or earthly material-
collier county has not alleged Foggs is in violation of its conditional use permit by having gravel,
stone, concrete and earthly material on its property to sell, and indeed it cannot3, therefore it is
unknown what ..related materials" collier county thinks must be removed. Nor has collier
t Foggs conditional use specifically provides that it can sell mulch, stone,
fertilizers, pesticidJs and other products...accessory to or required for the planting or maintenance
of said plants. [LDC, Section 2.03.01(cX2l). one would assume that stone would include
gravel, and "earthly material" would be required for planting.
Page 5 of 12
County disclosed in the Notice what "equipment" it deems a violation ofthe LDC and what
authority it has to force the removal of that equipment.
10. Finally, the bottom ofthe Notice contains a paragraph ofvery small type that begins with a
"t" but refers to nothing else in the Notice. It states:
"This violation may require additional compliance and approval from other departments
which may be required under local, state and federal regulations, including, but not limited to:
right-of-way permit, denotition of strucare, Site Development Plan, Insubstantidl Change to Site
Development Plan, and Vafiances along with, payment of impact fees, and any new or outstanding
fees requiredfor approval. "
There is nothing about the alleged violation or the obvious remedy if the violation is proven by
Collier County that relates to these "additional requirements." Collier County seeks to obtain an
Order to Comply directed to Foggs, without disclosing any facts and circumstances, much less
proving them to get this requested remedy. Once again, the Notice violates Foggs' right to due
process and violates the Rules and Regulations goveming any Code Enforcement proceeding'
I l. collier county code Enforcement sent Foggs a Notice with a "Description ofconditions
Constituting the Violations." To comport with due process, that Notice was required to inform
Foggs ofthe specific violation(s), so Foggs understood what collier county must prove to prevail
and it could defend against the allegations. Nothing about most of this Notice provides the
constitutionally required information and Collier County understands this.
12. what code Enforcement seeks is to do here is use the Notice to Foggs and the ensuing
Hearing, to bootstrap remedies for what it apparently perceives are violations committed by Foggs
without disclosing the specific violations to Foggs and without assuming the burden ofproviding
competent and substantial evidence ofthose violations. It seeks to leave Foggs in the dark and
without the opportunity to object and present defenses to the unknown violations at the scheduled
Page 6 of 12
hearing.
13. The Notice is nothing but "gotcha govemment" and violates every principle of fair play
and procedural due process. Procedural due process protects a citizen from such conduct by a
govemmental entity because such conduct undermines the public's confidence that agencies of
govemment will be fair and impartial in the enforcement of laws against citizens.
14. Where a Notice violates procedural due process, it must be dismissed
15. Should it be decided that neither the Special Magistrate nor the code Enforcement Board
has the authority or discretion to dismiss the Notice of Violation, then it must issue an order
limiting the Hearing scheduled for August 7, 2020, to the stated violation' the facts and
circumstances constituting that specific violation and, should the violation be proved by Collier
County, the obvious and narrow remedy sought in the Notice. There is clear authority for such a
limiting order in chapter 162.07 which states in regard to the conduct ofa hearing, that "[F]ormal
rules ofevidence shall not apply, but fundamenlal due process shall be observed and shall govern
the proceedings )' Ch. 162.07(3), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added)
Memorandum of Law
Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions that deprive
individuats of liberty or property intetests. Massey v. Charlotte County, Florida,842 So.2d 142,144
(Fla. 2d DCA 2003'), ciring, County ofPasco v Riehl,620 5o.2d229,231(Fla. 2"d DCA 1993). The
outlines of procedural due process are well-established. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
fundamental requisite ofdue process is the opportunity to be heard. Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 3 14 ( 1950). An elementary and fundamental requirement of due
process in any proceeding to be accorded finality is notice reasonable calculated, under all
Page 7 of 12
circumstances, to apprise interested parties ofthe pendency ofthe action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections. Dswson v. Saada,608 So. 2d 806, 808 (Fla. 1992) citing,
Mullane, supra.
The extent ofprocedural protection varies with the nature ofthe proceeding involved, but
due process requires both notice and a real opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a
meaningfulmanner}'Hadleyv.DepartmentofAdministation,4ll So.2d184, 187 (Fla. 1982);.
Keys Citizens for Responsible Gov't, Inc. v. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Authority,795 So. 2d 940, 948
(Fla. 2001). The notice has to be of such nature as to reasonably convey the required information.
Supra, ciling, Mullane, 339 U.S. at3l4
The Second DCA has addressed what information is required in a notice in the context of a
Code Enforcement proceeding. Massey,$42 So. 2d at 145. It found that when considering
Chapter 162, it was often necessary to fill the procedural gaps [in Chapter 162] by the common
sense application ofbasic principles ofdue process.a Supra. The same would be true of the only
slightly more specific notice requirement in the Collier County LDC' [ftr. 2, below] The court
cited three relevant factors to decide what process is due:
a Chapter 162.06(l) says in relevant part here:
.....if a violation is found, the code inspector shall notiry the violator and give him or her a
reasonable opportunity to correct the violation' "
Section 2-2026 Collier County Code ofordinances states:
Ifa violation ofa code or ordinance is believed to exist, the code Enforcement officer shall
provide notice and speciff a reasonable time to correct the violation(s). Notice shall be given in
iwiting and shall specifu the alleged violation, the required corrective action and the time period
for correction.
Page 8 of 12
l) the private interest that will b€ affected by the official action;
2) the risk of erroneous deprivation ofsuch interest tlrough the procedure used; and
3) the government's interests and burdens that additional or substitute procedural
requirements would entail. Supra al 146, citing Keys Citizens for Responsible Gov't, Inc.,
795 So.2d at34849
l) The Private Interest Affected:
Foggs clearly has a compelling interest in retaining and conducting its business without
govemmental interference. It is not clear from the Notice Collier County sent to Foggs how much
of its business Collier County seeks to shut down for unspecified violations ofthe LDC, but even a
cursory review ofthe remedies it wants to impose on the business shows how broadly Collier
County wants to permanently affect Foggs' business.
2) The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation Through the Procedure Used:
The risk to Foggs of an erroneous deprivation based on the Notice, is enormous. Call the Notice
"gotcha government," call it "hiding the ball" " bad faith," or cynical govemmental overreach.
The remedies Collier County seeks to impose on Foggs represent a deliberate attempt by a
govemmental agency to shut down a business, without the necessity of disclosing any concrete
violations that would justifi such a shut-down and without the necessity of proving those
undisclosed violations with substantial and competent evidence.
3) The Government's Burden for Additional Procedural Requirementss
The government has no additional burden here. The Notice provided to Foggs represents the
failure ofa govemment agency to do its job and cite, in the Notice, the required specific violations,
the required facts and circumstances that indicate a violation ofthe LDC, and the remedies it
seeks for those violations as dictated by the Rules and Regulations goveming Code Enforcement
Page 9 of 12
proceedings, Collier County Ordinance, the LDC and Florida statutes. It cannot claim that
compliance with state and local law and the state and federal constitutions, is unduly burdensome.
Appllng the Massel three factor examination ofwhat process is constitutionally required
here, it is clear that" at a minimum, FoCgs is entitled to know all the alleged specific violations of
the LDC that Collier County seeks to enforce, all the facts and circumstances supporting each
violation and what remedy it seeks for each specific violation. In the alternative Massey dictates
that due process requires limiting the Hearing to the alleged noticed violation, the facts and
circumstances it alleges that support finding a violation and the limited and logical remedy ifa
violation is proved by substantial and competent evidence.
It can't be argued the Procedures outlined in Article Four ofboth the Code Enforcement
Board and Special Magistrate Rules and Regulations cure the due process infirmities. Section 4
requires the Code Enforcement Investigator to submit a charging packet of information detailing
the alleged violations to the Secretary of the Board or office of the Magistrate at least fifteen
business days prior to the Hearing. While the alleged "violator" is allowed to provide an
answer/response packet, it must be submitted five business days prior to the Hearing' There is no
specific time stated in the Procedures for delivery ofthe Code Enforcement charging packet to the
alleged "violator." Even if it was delivered to the alleged "violator" at the same time it was
submitted to the Special Magistrate or the Board, the alleged violator will only have ten days to
prepare a defense and has thus been deprived ofthe thirty-day window between delivery of the
Notice of violation and the Notice of Hearing and the thirty-day window between the Notice of
Hearing and the Hearing to investigate the alleged violations and prepare a defense, including
witnesses, documentary evidence and subpoenas. And, it is not clear Collier County is under any
Page l0 of 12
obligation to put anything in its charging packet beyond the single violation that was Noticed to
Foggs.
On July 2, 2020, the Fifth DCA addressed the issue ofnotice in a domestic violence
proceeding where the Petitioner, at the Hearing, was allowed to introduce, over objection, evidence
of additional acts of domestic violence that were not alleged in the Petition for Injunction. In
finding the court erred in allowing the testimony, the 5'h DCA said adequate notice must provide
some indication ofthe witnesses to be called and the evidence to be utilized to prove entitlement to
relief. I G. G. v. M.5.,2020 WL 3579766. The two new material allegations, raised for the first
time at the hearing, deprived the Husband ofthe right to due process as he was given neither proper
notice of these allegations nor a full and fair opportunity to prepare to rebut them. The same
reasoning applies here. The Notice to Foggs contains an unrelated claim of violation of the LDC,
without any alleged facts and circumstances supporting the violation and numerous requests for
remedies not even remotely related to the disclosed violation.
Foggs has been deprived of proper notice and the oppornrnity to prepare a defense to most
of the Notice of Violation. The deprivation constitutes a violation ofFoggs right to procedural
due process. The violation ofa litigant's due process right to be heard requires reversal or, in this
case, dismissal ofthe notice. S.B.L. v. State,737 So. 2d I l3l (Fla. InDCA 1999), citingto, Riehl,
635 So. 2"d at 19. In the altemative, due process and Florida law require the Hearing be limited to
the stated violation, Section 2.02.03 ofthe LCD directly relating to the alleged violation, and the
obvious and constitutional remedy stated in the notice for t]re violation.
WHEREFORE, Respondent, FOGGS II'n/ESTMENTS LLC, respecttully requests
dismissal of the Notice dated May 11,2020, in Case Number CELU20200000904, or limitation of
Page 1l of 12
the Hearing set for August 7 ,202A, to accord with procedural due process, and the award of its
costs, pursuant to F.S. 57.105.
itted on behalf of Respondent by:
J.
Florida Bar
MacALISTER, Esq.
:080471 I
LAW OFFICES OF
COLLEEN J. MacALISTER, P.A
5061 NapoliDive
Naples, Florida 34103
Phone: (239)262-3760
FAX: (239) 790-5779
colleen@cjmaclaw.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that three true and correct copies of the foregoing have been
mailed by US Mailto the Office of the Special Magistrate, c/o Collier County Code Enforcement,
2800 North Horseshoe Drive, Naples, Florida 34104, and a true and correct copy has been mailed
by US Mail to: Collier County Board of County Commissioners, 3301 Tamiami Trail East,
Building F, Naples, Florida 34112 on this 12'h day of July 2020.
J. MacALISTER
Florida Bar No: 080471 I
Page 12 of 12
.a
COI-UER GOUNTY CG)E ENFORCENE}JT
t{oTlcE oFvtoLATloH
Ormm FOGC'S II{\€STITENTS LLC
lszT0IMM(}KALEE ED
NAPLES, FL 3{120
Begtstersd AgGn$ Fogg, Stanley R Jr
l-oc.fion: 102?0 lmrml$abc RD, Naples 34120'
L6call0n: 10270 |rnrnol(alee RD, Naples
Unincorporzted Colla.r CoultY
Zooing DiEE rlprca&y u"gal D*crlotion: 25 {8 26 E l/2 Of Nw 114 OF NE 1/4, LESS ORII{E ur
3es2 FG r35
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Caee l{umbec CELUAn000lPlf4
DeE: liay 1t.2020
krveiligrtofi .lohn Fucnkt
'|hor*: 239')52b'12'?
TAKIHG OEEC IN $R
ilonce
Fursurnt to Gqdlier Coufi Con$did.t€d CoOe entOrCemed R'guLliom, Collier Counly- Code- of
Ler: rnd Ordinencer, Cfreper Z. Articte lX, you aru noEnld th-t ' Ybhtioil(sl ol fhe lolbwing
Coj1ior County Ordinenoc6f rnd or PUD Regutatira(:) Gd*ts st the abovedatcritxd bcetion'
ffitnencelCorle: Garroral provin,ions l.snd Use. ColLc, County [-€nd DeYolopment ffie &{41 as
'sH*n#d, Section 1 04.01{A}
The Collier Ga{n$ Land Opretopncnt Code, 2004-41, As Arnended, S€L{on 2 02 03' ProhrBrted Usee
A. t'fie rfovieicnE of thi: LDC shd aFply lo 8lt lard, Prop+{y rnd de|Telcfmc$t rn tne-roEil unirffirporstect a'€e o{
Collier County 6rcopt es erprotfy itii ip"r*ntury ilg,/lded o$Enrisc iritus LDC No derre*r:pment stall bc
rndertatren withoqr *or a*ffi$]n prlrJti1f*1DC- Spacifi<zq;, rc buildirq',rfuciure' lsnd of watcr $hsg
herea{t€f be ds{€loped. o, grB.ipied, and no hddinE. llruchlfG, or pea fhereot thal be *rected' recptdtuCtX{'
mo.r€d, locd€d, or *rt ,arr"ff-ir.&-"i,*rx i, cotfirnt;ry *tn fte' regulations tel torlh llBr€in ard rorrP roftirE
disrid in which rl i$ lo61.d.:
Any use or slrusture not speciFcally identlfrcd in a zani|lg disBict as a permitted u3e' sonditional us8' or
aci:ssory use shall lr€ prohibited in ilclr zoning dtqtrirJ :
Ybtatbn Stelue - lnitial
DESCRtPTloil oF coNnmoils coilsr]TunfiG-Tl+E vlol-ATl0ll(s)'
DE Yfrtnsss: fhe ptos.tt*ii'gl6Eing Gmva' gtoncJConcrete and rerthly metedal wiElout E
conditlonal usc.
qffi the loBo'ring cocrecrive a6rion{s):
lnitiat InsPection
l.MuslCornplywithelltandusesilEadardsoftheGolliercounvLandDeveloprnentcode04-4{'er
arftEnded and Brr#;;;1;"po**o Stte Derelcpmcrrt Plan iqr sed lrcation'
2ceffieanylauuflautrffiiz€dacriviry*,whlch!snotap€rmitle(t.fficessory.o'EneppfoYed
condrtionst uge lar said locahon'
EXHIBIT A
3- Must sbtein afl required Collier County aoprcr€ls, if applicabla, hy arry neans rcquirsd to opB,frc
the proaessing/recycling adivitiet or re,nove aE lElated met€nal and equiprneni br unapproved
used sn said loqstofl,
Ot{ OR BEFORE: 05,31120?0
Failure to correct violetions maf rssufr in:
l ) Mandatory nolice to *pp".r - t*ance o, a citatron fia( may rc+utt in finet up to t500 and cosl3 af
Prmecuiisn. OR
2l CoOe Enhrcement Boarct revis\v that may r€utt in nnes up ta S't0o0 pcf day pcr violaiion, rs 10ng ;rs
th€ viotstion remains. and oosts of proseculon-
INOUIRIES AXD COMMENTS SHOULD BE
DIRECTEO TO CODE ENFORCEMEI{T
2800 ifortr Horseshoe Dr. t*aptes, FL 34104
Pione: 23925?-?{40 FAX 235252'Z3/,O
SERVED BY:
lnvect{abr Signature
John Fuentes
Care Nunb*r: CELU202OO000!P{
*'
Signature and Ti!08 ol Rec,Pient
-PrinteO Nsne of Recipieot
Oete
:.,r:.,,.tr*llfitiamrarrnqdnrddBodErrnslLoarrh,lrpr@ydfromoanrd.psrbr.fiE.ritfiEhE rb._nqrdrtd,trrdsrlo6d.
*r.u urd tdcr.r n3uiliiiil r,a,,c,'s' dt 1atttil'ffi-*qJr,lr, Pfli qry'g;1ffiffiJ f,#ffi ffios,,er.n t*tttt*-t.kriiuiJri* cnrfr |o8b Dq.rdop|natt nHr. ildvrrbnEti u
ary fict{ o, outBho(llng fte3 rE"quart{ lo apprutd'
Collier County, FL l,and Development Code
2.02.03 - Prohibited Uses
Any use or structure not specifically identified in a zoning district as a permitted use,
conditional use, or accessory use shall be prohibited in such zoning district.
abouLblank
lofl
EX{IBITB
7l7l2O, r:46 PM
Collier County, FL [,and Development Code
1 .04.01 - Generally
A. The provisions of this LDC shall apply to all land, property and development in the
total unincorporated area of Collier County except as expressly and speciflcally
provided otherwise in this LDC. No development shall be undertaken without prior
authorization pursuant to this LDC.
Specifically, no building , structure , land or water shall hereafter be developed, or
occupied, and no building , structure , or part thereof shall be erected, reconstructed,
moved, located, or structurally altered except in conformity with the regulations set
forth herein and for the zoning district in which it is located.
B. The regulations established in this LDC and within each zoning district shall be
minimum or maximum limitations, as the case may be, and shall apply uniformly to
each class or kind of structure , use, land or water, except where specific provision is
made in this LDC.
C. ThisLDCshall applytoall division of land and all subdivisions in the total
unincorporated area of Collier County, except to the extent as expressly provided
herein. lt shall be unlawful for any person to create a subdivision ol or to subdivide,
or to otherwise divide, any land in the total unincorporated area of Collier County,
except in strict conformance with the provisions of this LDC and any applicable
provisions of the Collier County Growth Management Plan (GMP).
E)CIIBITC
about:blank
lofl 7l7l2O, l:44 PM