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Agenda 07/08/2014 Item # 10AProposed Agenda Changes Board of County Commissioners Meeting July 8, 2014 Add On Item 10A: Recommendation that the Board direct the County Attorney to work with the County Manager and the Sheriffs Office to prepare and bring back a proposed ordinance that would establish a Collier County Sexual Offender and Sexual Predator Residency Ordinance that is more restrictive than State Statute. (Commissioner Fiala's request) Add On Item IOB: Recommendation to l) Direct staff to develop and bring forward a Land Development Code Amendment regarding the regulation of automobile service stations, including gas stations, adjacent to residential property which have more than eight (8) fuel pumps or provide for fueling of more than eight (8) cars at any point in time; and 2) Adopt a resolution to stay the receipt of new applications for development orders regarding automobile service stations, including gas stations, adjacent to residential property while the proposed land use regulation is prepared and vetted. (Commissioner Fiala's request) Continue Item IIA to the September 912014 BCC Meeting: Recommendation to authorize advertising an ordinance creating the Platt Road Improvement Municipal Service Taxing Unit to fund and levy not to exceed three mils of Ad Valorem Taxes per year to reimburse the County $10,500 for emergency roadway improvements made to Platt Road. (Commissioner Nance's request) Withdraw Item 11E: Recommendation to award Bid No. 14 -6269, "Collier County Northeast Recycling Drop -off Center," to Cleveland Construction in the amount of $5,156,769.21; and, authorize a budget amendment of $1,400,000 to move funds from Project No. 59015, "Airspace Recovery," to Project 59009, "Northeast Recycling Drop -off Center." (Staffs request) Continue Indefinitely Item 16K4: Recommendation to authorize the County Attorney to file a lawsuit on behalf of the Collier County Board of County Commissioners against the Vineyards Development Corporation, Debra Lee Gogan, Amelia Sosa, and Astrid Ramireza in the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, in and for Collier County, Florida, to recover damages for the repair of a traffic control box in the amount of $30,771.56, plus costs of litigation. (County Attorney's request) Note: Item I IC Executive Summary title should read: Recommendation to approve an Agreement for Sale and Purchase with Asset Recovery XVIII, LLC, for the purchase of property to accommodate the future Wilson /Benefield Benfield alignment and improved access to the Resource Recovery Business Park and approve a budget amendment. Also, in the Objective section, the reference to a "302 + / -" acre parcel should be revised to a "305.59" acre parcel. (Staffs request) Item 16AI Executive Summary title should read: Recommendation to approve an extension of two three years for completion of Site Development Plan (SDP) improvements associated with Tenchitas Convenience Store (SDP AR- 14305) pursuant to Section 10.02.03 H of the Collier County Land Development Code. (Staffs request) Proposed Agenda Changes Board of County Commissioners Meeting July 8, 2014 Page 2 Item 16A17 Executive Summary title should read: Recommendation to approve seven releases of code enforcement liens with a combined accrued value of $138,238.19, for payment of $4,188.19 and a related settlement agreement, in the code enforcement actions entitled Board of County Commissioners v. Judith Harbrecht Hill and William P. Hill, Trustees, in Special Magistrate Case Nos. CEPM20100008282, CEPM20110004402, CEPM20110011182, CEPM20120000872, CEV20120000968, CENA20120009734 AND CEPM20120017192, relating to property located at 451 Torrey Pines Point, Collier County, Florida. Also, the Recommendation section should read: That the Board of County Commissioners waives accrued fines in the amount of $134,050, accept payment of $4,188.19, releases the liens, and authorizes the Chairman to sign the attached lien releases for recording in the Official Public Records, and attached Mutual General Release and Settlement Agreement. (Staffs request) Item 16E10: For purchases estimated to be greater than $50,000 per order and less than $200,000 per order, the department may quote out work among the awarded vendor(s) with Purchasing Department approval. (Staffs request) Items 17B and 17C: This item requires that ex parte disclosure be provided by Commission members. Should a hearing be held on this item, all participants are required to be sworn in. (Staffs request) Time Certain Requests: Item 11D to be heard at 10:45 a.m. (Commissioner Fiala's request) 7/812014 10:417 AM Martha S. Verqara From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject: Attachments: Good afternoon, 1 Brock, MaryJo Monday, July 07, 2014 2:35 PM DLCOMM; Minutes and Records; Klatzkow, Jeff; Neet, Virginia; Althouse, Tammy; Durham, Tim; Sheffield, Michael; Price, Len; Yilmaz, George; Carnell, Steve; Casalanguida, Nick; Crystal K. Kinzel; Flanagan, Jim; Hayes, Karen; Pettit, Jim; Scardino, Alexandra; Smith, Camden Brock, MaryJo Add on item(s) Add On Item 10A.pdf; Add On Item 10B.pdf Attached please find two add on items to tomorrow's agenda. Items 10A and 10B. Thank you, MJ Mary -Jo Brock - Executive Assistant to Leo E. Ochs, Jr. - County Manager's Office maryjob_r_ock@colliergov.net 239.252.8364 Under Florida Law, e -mail addresses are public records. If you do not want your e -mail address released in response to a public records request, do not send electronic mail to this entity. Instead, contact this office by telephone or in writing. Add On Item 10A July 8, 2014 BCC Meeting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Recommendation that the Board direct the County Attorney to work with the County Manager and the Sheriff's Office to prepare and bring back a proposed ordinance that would establish a Collier County Sexual Offender and Sexual Predator Residency Ordinance that is more restrictive that State Statute. OBJECTIVE: To better protect the children of Collier County. CONSIDERATIONS: Florida Statutes 775.215 provides that certain defined convicted sexual offenders and predators may not reside within 1,000 feet of any school, child care facility, park, or playground. I recently discussed my concern with the County Attorney that there are large numbers of convicted sexual offenders and predators clustered in family neighborhoods just outside these limitations. The County Attorney advised me that since the last time the Board discussed this matter, it has been judicially determined that a local government may enact stricter regulations than the State Statute. I would like the Board to direct the County Attorney to work with the County Manager and the Sheriff's Office to bring back a proposed Sexual Offender and Sexual Predator Residency Ordinance that is more restrictive that State Statute. FISCAL IMPACT: None at this time. GROWTH MANAGEMENT IMPACT: None. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS: The County Attorney has reviewed this item and approved it as to form and legality. Majority support of the Board is required for approval. A copy of the referenced legal decision is attached as back -up. -JAK COMMENDATION: That the Board of County Commissioners direct the County Attorney RE to work with the County Manager and the Sheriff exualf Offender and Sexual Predator Residency ordinance that would establish a Collier County Ordinance that is more restrictive than State Statute. PREPARED BY: Commissioner Donna Fiala. Attachment: The decision involving Exile and Bloom vs. Miami -Dade County. 0 LexisNexis� 1 of 1 DOCUMENT Bryan A. Exile and Elliot M. Bloom, Appellants, vs. Miami -Dade County, Appellee. No. 3D09 -2768 COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT 35 So. 3d 118; 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 6919; 35 Fla. L. Weekly D 1121 May 19, 2010, Opinion Filed SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Released for Publication June 4, 2010. PRIORHISTORY: [ * *I] An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami -Dade County, Pedro P. Echarte, Jr., Judge. Lower Tribunal No. 09- 51205. COUNSEL: Florida Institutional Legal Services, and Cassandra Capobianco, Robert Dwyer, Christopher Jones and Peter Sleasman; American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, and Maria Kayanan and Randall C. Marshall; Jeanne Baker, for appellants. R.A. Cuevas, Jr., County Attorney, and Thomas W. Logue, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee. JUDGES: Before WELLS and ROTHENBERG, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. OPINION BY: SCHWARTZ OPINION [* 118] SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. As the trial court held in an excellent opinion, we conclude that Section 21 -281 of the Miami -Dade County Code 1, which prohibits convicted sexual offenders from ( *119] residing within 2500 feet of a school, is not invalidated by Florida law and therefore remains in full Page I force and effect. Neither of the appellants' contentions to the contrary is well taken: I "It is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a violation of Sections 794.011 (sexual battery), 800.04 (lewd and lascivious acts on/in presence of persons under age 16), 827.071 (sexual performance by a child) or 847.0145 (selling or buying of minors for portrayal in sexually explicit conduct), Florida Statutes, or a similar law of another jurisdiction, in which the victim of the offense [ * *2] was less than sixteen (16) years of age, to reside within 2,500 feed of any school." Miami -Dade County, Fla, Code of Ordinances, § 21- 281(a) (2009). (a) The legislature has not clearly preempted local regulation of the field of the post - conviction conduct of sexual predators, so as to invoke the severely restricted and strongly disfavored doctrine of "implied preemption." See Browning v. Sarasota Alliance for Fair Elections, Inc., 968 So. 2d 637 (Fla 2d DCA 2007), reversed on other grounds 28 So. 3d 880 (Fla. 2010); City of Hollywood v. Mulligan, 934 So. 2d 1238, 1243 (Fla 2006); Tribune Co. v. Cannella, 458 So. 2d 1075, 1077 (Fla. 1984); Phantom of Clearwater v. Pennellas County, 894 So. 2d 1011, 1019 (Fla 2d DCA 2005), approved sub. nom, Phantom of Brevard v. Brevard County, 3 So. 3d 309, 315 (Fla. 2009); Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So. 2d 1199, 1207 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), rev. denied, 789 So. 2d 346 (2000) ( "The courts should be 10 35 So. 3d 118, *119; 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 6919, * *2; 35 Fla. L. Weekly D 1121 careful in imputing intent on behalf of the Legislature to preclude a local elected governing body from exercising its home rule powers. "); Tallahassee Mein. Reg. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Tallahassee Med. Ctr., Inc., 681 So. 2d 826, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); and (b) The 2500 foot provision is [ * *31 not in cognizable "conflict" with the less restrictive 1000 foot buffer zone provided by Section 794.065(!) 2 Florida Statutes. See Laborers' Infl. Union of N. Am., Local 478 v. Burroughs, 541 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1989) (holding ordinance did not conflict with statute because a party could comply with the ordinance without violating the statute); Metro. Dade County v. Santos, 430 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Jordan Chapel Freewill Baptist Church v. Dade County, 334 So. 2d 661, 664 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 949 (1977); E.B. Elliott Advertising Co. v. Metro. Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141, 1150 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding a county ordinance Page 2 that required outdoor signs to be set back 200 feet from streets did not conflict with a state statute that required outdoor signs be set back 15 feet from the streets because a person could comply with the County ordinance without violating the state statute). Compare Scavella v. Fernandez, 371 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (expressly distinguishing Jordan Chapel and E.B. Elliott). 2 "It is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a violation of s. 794.011, s. 800.04, s. 827.071, s. 847,0135(5), or s. 847.0145, regardless of whether [ * *4] adjudication has been withheld, in which the victim of the offense was less than 16 years of age, to reside within 1,000 feet of any school, day care center, park, or playground.. . ." § 794.065(1) Fla. Stat. (2009). Affirmed. I0A l0A IN THE CRCUIT COURT OF THE 11TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR MIAMI-DARE COUNTY, FLORIDA GENERAL JURISDICTION DMSION CASE NO. 09 -51205 CA 13 BRYAN A. EXILE and ELLIOTT M. BLOOM, Plaintiffs, MIAMI -DARE COUNTY, Defendant. ORDER GRAN i'ING FINAL JUDGI pj-r QN T Pi EADTNGS IN F IMD 9F DEFEND'4N Y. Facts Plaintiffs, who are convicted sexual offenders, have challenged the validity of the Miami - Dade County Sexual Offender and Sexual Predator Residency Ordinance, §§ 21 -177 — 21 -284 of the Codo of Miami -Dade County.' Plaintiffs contend that by enacting various sexual offender and predator statutes the Florida Legislature impliedly preempted Miami -Dade County's Ordinance. Defendant now seeks a judgment on the pleadings as a matter of law. In relevant part, the County Ordinance prohibits convicted sexual offenders from residing within 2,500 feet of a scbooL § 21 -218, Miami -Dade County Code. It provides exceptions for sexual offenders who established a residency before the effective date of the ordinance; who were minors when they committed the offense; or who established a residence prior to a school being built within 2,500 of the residence. § 21 -281, Miami -Dade County Code. -)k� l0A CASE NO. 09 -51205 CA 13 Page 2 II. Legal Standard As a preliminary matter, the court finds that a motion for judgment on the pleadings may properly be considered in this case. Judgment on the pleadings can be entered if the merits of the case can be determined as a matter of law from the pleadings. Trail Burger Kung, Inc. v Burger King of Miami, Inc., 187 S0.2d 55, 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate in this case because the complaint is grounded on a claim of implied preemption and, thus, presents a pure issue of law. See, Roberts v. Metropolitan Dade County, 354 So.2d 472 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) C"the trial court did not err in entering a judgment on the pleadings which determined ... legislative intent.'). Implied preemption is dependent on legislative intent. See, e.g., Lowe v. Broward 1. County, 766 So.2d 1199, 1207 (Fla. 4t° DCA 2000), rev.' denied, 789 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 2001). Legislative intent turns on statutory interpretation and "( sttatutory interpretation is a question of law." Bellsouth, Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So.2d 287, 289 (Fla. 2003); see, also Talbott v. American Isuau Motors, Inc., 934 So.2d 643, 644 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (holding that the question whether a statute preempts another regulation is a question of law). Accordingly, implied preemption is usually resolved on a limited record and is often determined by motions to dismiss based solely on legal argument. See, e.g., State v Harden, 873 So.2d 352 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), qfd, 938 So.2d 480 (Fla. 2006). Implied preemption can normally be resolved "strictly based on a review of the plain text of [the statute] and the plain text of the ordinance...." Phantom of Clearwater, Ina v. Pinellas County, 894 So.2d 1011, 1015 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), approved, Phantom of Brevard, Inc. v. Brevard County, 3 So.2d 309 (Fla. 2008). Therefore, as stated by the Second District Court of Appeals, "(i]n light of the legal issues presented — preemption and conflict with state law — the at5, CASE NO. 09 -51205 CA 13 Page 3 Purpose of the evidentiary hearing is unclear." Browning v. Sarasota Alliance for Fair Blecdons, Inc., 968 So.2d 637, 642 n.2 (Fla 2d DCA 2007). Plaintiffs bear a heavy burden of persuasion because "( i]mplied preemption is disfavored in Florida." Meteor Motors, Inc, v. Thompson Halbach & Assoc., 914 So.2d 479, 483 (Fla 41' DCA 2005. Kligelf v. State Office of Fin. Reg., 876 So.2d 36, 38 (Fla. 4`' DCA 2004) (`The Florida Supreme Court has made clear that implied preemption is not favored under Florida law.' }. Implied preemption is disfavored for two reasons, First, the Florida Constitution and law reflect a strong commitment to self - government at the local level and, therefore, "courts should be careful in imputing intent on behalf of the Legislature to preclude a.local elected governing body from exercising its home rule powers." Lowe v, Broward County, ,766 So.2d 1199, 1207 (Fla. 4`h DCA 2000), rev. denied, 789 So.2d 346 (Fps. 2001). Second, the courts are understandably reluctant to preclude local self - government based on legislative silence because "if the legislature can easIIy create express preemption 'by including clear language in a statute, there is little justification for the courts to insert such words into a statute." Phantom of Clearwater, Inc. v Pinellas County, 894 Sold 1011, 1019 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), approved, 3 So.2d 309 (Fla. 2008). As a result, in Florida, implied preemption has been found only onoe at the appellate level and it has been rejected over eighteen times? M. Analysis of Implied Preemption To determine if the Legislature intended to impliedly preempt a local ordinance, courts use a two pronged test: "Implied preemption should be found to exist only in cases where the 2For a list of these cases, see Appendix "A" to this Order, . a �� I0A CASE NO. 09 -51205 CA 13 Page 4 legislative scheme is so pervasive as to evidence an intent to preempt the particular area, and where strong public policy reasons exist for finding such an area to be preempted by the Legislature." Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Tallahassee Medical Center, Inc,, 681 So.2d 826, 831 (Fla. V' DCA 1996) (emphasis added). Because implied preemption is disfavored,. the Supreme Court has emphasized that it can be found only "so long as it is clear that the legislature has clearly preempted local regulation of the subject." City of Hollywood v. Mulligan, 934 So.2d 1238, 1243 (Fla. 2006) (reversing court that found implied preemption) (emphasis added). A. Florida Sexual Offender Laws are Not Sufficiently Pervasive to Clearly Indicate Preemptive Infim( Plaintiffs contend that the statutes governing sexual offenders are so pervasive that they indicate the Legislature intended to occupy the field and preclude any Iocal ordinances. It is certainly true that the. Legislature has passed laws regarding sexual offenders such as making sexual molestation of children a crime; providing for penalties, parole, and probation; requiring released felons to register their residences; providing for community notification about sexual offenders' crimes and addresses; and prohibiting released felons from living within 1,000 feet of schools, day cares, parks, or playgrounds. See, e.g., §§ 775.21, 77524, 794.065, 943.0435, 943.04351, 943.04352, 943.04353, 943.04354, 943.0436, 948.30, 948.31, 948.32, Fla. Stat. Under Florida's standard fur implied preemption, however, these statutes are not sufficiently pervasive to demonstrate that the legislature has clearly preempted local regulation of the subject. These statutes are substantially less pervasive and comprehensive than the laws governing marriage, divorce, and family at issue in Lowe v. Brmvard County, 766 So.2d 1199 aa\ CASE NO. 09 -51205 CA 13 Page 5 (4'h DCA 2000), rev'd denied, 789 So.2d 346 (Fla. 2001). Notwithstanding the fact that the marriage and ply laws at issue in Lowe cover five separate chapters of Florida Statutes and span over 107 pages, the Fourth District Court of Appeals held that such comprehensive laws did not impliedly preempt a county from enacting an ordinance extending benefits to domestic partners. In 11111sborough County v. Fla. Rest, Assn, 603 So.2d 587 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), the Court held that the state's comprehensive laws governing the sale of food and alcohol (which cover over eleven separate chapters of Florida Statutes and span over 159 pages) should not be read to preempt by" implication an ordinance requiring notice to pregnant women of the dangers of alcohol. Similarly, the Third District Court of Appeals found that the extensive and comprehensive statutes governing condominiums (which cover six chapters of Florida Statutes and span more than 210 pages) did not preempt a city ordinance governing condominium conversions. City ofMiamt Beach v. Rodo Corp., 404 So.2d 1066 (Fla 3d DCA 1981). Florida's sexual offender laws are not sufficiently pervasive to support a finding of clear legislative intent to preempt local ordinances. As explained by the Supreme Corot, Florida law requires "a more restrictive application of the preemption doctrine, precluding preemption and leaving `home rule' to [local governments] unless the legislature has expressly said otherwise." Tribune Co. v. Cannella, 458 So.2d 10.75, 1077 (Fla. 1984) (emphasis added). See, also Kurtz v. City of North. Miami, 625 So.2d 899, 900 rLl (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 653 So.2d 1025 (Fla 1995) (finding that the Florida Clean Indoor Air Act, § 386202, Fla. Stat. does not preempt a municipal administrative order governing hiring of smokers). B. - Florida Legislative History Indicates No Intention to Preempt 10A 10AI I CASE NO. 09 -51205 CA 13 Page 6 The legislative history of Florida's sexual offender statutes suggests that Florida's Legislature, did not intend to preempt local residency ordinances. Florida's legislative history demonstrates that the Legislature has had ample opportunities to preempt local sexual offender residency ordinances, but has chosen not to do so. . Indeed, in the 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 Legislative Sessions, the Legislature considered and rejected numerous bills which would have expressly preempted local sexual offender residency ordinances? As reasoned by Judge Wolf in Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center, Inc, Y. Tallahassee Medical Center, Inc., 681 So2d 826, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), "if the legislature can easily create express preemption by including clear language in a statute, there is little justification for the courts to insert such words into a statute" Phantom of Clearwater, Inc. v. Pinellas County, 894 So.2d 1011, 1019 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), approved, 3 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2008); see also Homestead Hosp., Inc. v. Miami -Dade County, 829 So.2d 259, 264 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (holding that the Legislature's refusal to sever certain statutory language indicated its intent that such language not be severed). For the same reason, there is little justification in this case to insert words of preemption into the statutes sub judice. Furthermore, on September 15, 2009, Florida Representative Qlorioso filed a bill seeking to, inter alia, preempt local sexual offender residency ordinances. HB 119 (2010). Thus, it appears the Legislature does not consider local ordinances on this subject to be preempted and 'Fla. HB 591, 2d Eng. (Reg. Sess. 2006); Fla. SB 768 (Reg. Sess. 2006); Fla HB 339 CS (Reg. Sess. 2006); Fla. HB 59 (Reg, Sess. 2007); Fla HB 533, § 3 (Reg. Sess. Reg. Sess. 2007); Fla. HB 683, § 2 (Rag, Sess, 2007); Fla. SB 2608 (Reg. Sess. 2207); Fla. CS for SB 2490 (Reg. Sess. 2008); Fla. CS for CS for SB 1430 § 2 (Reg. Sess. 2009); Fla. CS for CS for SB 320 (Reg. Sess. 2009). ME k-ASE NO. 09 -51205 CA 13 Page 7 continues to contemplate whether to explicitly preempt local sexual offender residency ordinances. Plaintiffs in this case are asking that the court read into the statute preemption language that the Legislature has considered and has, thus far, chosen not to add. In the words of the Third District Court of Appeals, "[o]bviously the legislature knew how to forbid local intrusion into regulation of this subject matter if it wished. Particularly in view of the settled rules which require that any such language be strictly construed, we decline to read such a provision into a statutory situs where it so obviously and pointedly does not appear." Metropolitan Dade County v. Santos, 430 So.2d 506, 508 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (finding Legislative silence did not amount to implied preemption of ordinance that was stricter than statute). This legislative history demonstrates this case does not fit the narrow exception that recognizes implied preemption only when "it is clear that the legislature has clearly preempted local regulation of the subject." Mulligan, 934 So.2d at 1243 (emphasis added). It can hardly be said that the Legislature "clearly" intended to impliedly preempt local ordinances when it repeatedly considered, but declined to do so expressly. IV. Statewide Uniformity Plaintiffs make various public policy arguments that the preemption of local sexual offender residency ordinances would be in the best interest of sexual offenders and their potential victims, however, as the First District Court of Appeals has stated; "implied preemption should be found to exist only in cases where the legislative scheme is so pervasive as to evidence an intent to preempt the particular area, and where strong public policy reasons exist for finding 10A CASE NO. 09 -51205 CA 13 Page 8 such an area to be preempted by the Legislature." Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center, Inc, v. Tallahassee Medical Center, Inc,, 681 Sold 826, 831 (Fla. 1" DCA 1996) (emphasis added). This court has already found that there is an absence of legislative intent to preempt local sex offender residency ordinances and, thus, this court will discuss, but not decide whether preemption is "in the best interest" or not. There are compelling arguments both for and against statewide uniformity in this area. The overwhelming majority of the Florida county court judges who have examined this issue, for instance, have felt that some flexibility should be left at the local level "so that the size of the zones may be set based upon the character of each city or county...." State v. )lilson, Case No. MM07- 011177 -BA (Fla. Polk County Ct. March 4, 2009) (holding State did not preempt local sexual offender residency ordinances). See, e.g., State v. Chaddocl; 15 Fla Law Weekly Supp. 1109a (Miami -Dade County Ct. Sept. 29, 2008); State v, bong, 15 Fla Law Weekly Supp. 255 (Fla. Duvall County Ct Nov, 17, 2007). Furthermore, Florida's strong policy towards local home rule would be contrary to the view that such decisions should be centralized in Tallahassee. in fact, the Florida Supreme Court has recognized that local government meetings often provide the best forum for the competing interests involved to be weighed and resolved in making such decisions. See City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Assn for Retarded Citizens, Inc., 322 So.2d 571, 577 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), aff d, 332 So.2d 610 (1976) (finding absence of preemption by Legislature and finding that a state agency's placement of group home was subject to city zoning even though some local conununity groups advocated a "not- in -my- backyard" mentality). Such a need for judicially- mandated statewide uniformity has been found only ouce and that was in the area of vote verification. Browning v. Sarasota Alliance for Fair Elections, Inc., a) s NO. 09 -51205 CA 13 Page 9 968 So.2d 637, 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (`The regulation of voting cannot be given unequal application different parts of the state.'J. While the verification of a vote is not impacted by local circumstances, the issue of the most effoctive size of a sexual offender buffer zone may be impacted by local conditions for the reasons set forth above. Therefore, the need for judicially- imposed uniformity, while necessary in Browning, is not necessarily applicable in the instant case. Conclusion Based upon the text and legislative history of the state sexual offender laws, the court finds as a matter of law that the Legislature did not intend to preempt local offender residency ordinances. Final judgment on the pleadings is granted against plaintiffs and for Miami -Dade County and Miami -Dade County shall go hence without day. �b DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, at Miami, Florida on this _2 day of September, 2009. PEDRO ly ECHAR h, Jx CIRCUIt COURT JUDGE Copies to counsel of record D O